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Case Brief: First Circuit Clarifies Public Vessel Status
Under the Oil Pollution Act
June 2018

Highlights
•

•

•

The First Circuit issued the first decision interpreting the definition of “public
vessel” under the Oil Pollution Act. It held that “public vessel” should have the same
interpretation in both the Oil Pollution Act and Public Vessels Act.
The Oil Pollution Act does not apply to discharges from vessels in non-commercial
service that are owned by the federal government but contracted to a private
organization, so long as the federal government exercises operational control over
the vessel.
The holding may apply to other statutes with that use the term “public vessel.”

Background
The Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) does not apply to any discharge of oil from a public vessel.1
The OPA defines public vessel as “a vessel owned or bareboat chartered and operated by
the United States, or by a State or political subdivision thereof, or by a foreign nation,
except when the vessel is engaged in commerce.” 2 Until recently, no courts had ruled on
whether government-owned vessels operated under contract by non-governmental
entities are public vessels under this definition.
In Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. v. United States (“Ironshore”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit became the first appellate court to rule on whether government-owned vessels
operated under contract by a non-governmental entity are public vessels under the OPA.3
The court adopted the interpretation of “public vessel” under the Public Vessels Act
(“PVA”). In this context, other circuit courts have consistently held that vessels crewed by
contractors are public vessels when under the operational control of the government.4
Applying this test, the court found that a Military Sealift Command (“MSC”) vessel owned
by the Navy but crewed by a private contractor, American Overseas Marine Company, LLC
(“AMSEA”), was a public vessel under the OPA because AMSEA was acting under the
operational control of the United States.5 The decision suggests that vessels that are public
vessels under the PVA are likely to also be public vessels under the OPA.

Case Overview
Ironshore arose from the discharge of 11,000 gallons of fuel from the vessel Fisher into the
dry dock in which it was being serviced. 6 The owner of the dry dock, Boston Ship Repair
(“BSR”), contained and removed the fuel, at a cost of almost $3,000,000. 7 BSR’s insurer,
Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company (“Ironshore Specialty”), reimbursed these costs
before suing AMSEA and the United States for: “(1) cleanup costs and damages under OPA;
(2) a declaratory judgment finding AMSEA and the United States to be strictly liable parties
under OPA; and (3) damages sounding in general admiralty and maritime law as a result of
AMSEA’s and the United States’ alleged negligence.”8
The U.S. and AMSEA moved to dismiss the OPA claims, arguing that Fisher was a public
vessel and therefore that the discharges were excluded from OPA liability.9 They argued
that the Fisher qualified as a public vessel because it is both owned and operated by the
United States. Conversely, Ironshore Specialty argued that AMSEA was the sole operator of
the Fisher.10 The district court granted the motions to dismiss.11 Ironshore Specialty
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which issued its ruling in
September, 2017.12
The case presented an issue of first impression: no federal court, “aside from the district
court in this case . . . has been required to interpret the precise definition of ‘public vessel’
under the OPA.”13 The holding in Ironshore therefore is an important precedent for future
cases.
The First Circuit determined that “public vessel” should be “interpreted in the same
manner under both the PVA and the OPA.14 The court recognized that the definition of
“public vessel” set forth in the OPA requires that the government both own and operate the
vessel.15 The OPA “provides no definition of the word ‘operated,’”16 and the PVA does not
define “public vessel” at all. However, the court noted a long line of cases interpreting
“public vessel” under the PVA.17 Applying principles of statutory construction seeking
harmony between statutes and consistency in meaning, the court “harbor[ed] no doubt that
Congress intended the OPA term ‘public vessels’ to be interpreted in the same manner as
‘public vessels’ under the Public Vessels Act.”18
The Ironshore court had little difficulty in determining that a government-owned vessel
operated by a contractor can be a public vessel under both the PVA and the OPA. It
reviewed holdings from five other circuit courts in which vessels owned by the government
but operated under contract were consistently determined to be public vessels. 19 These
holdings established “a backdrop of federal law that [] consistently interpreted the term
‘public vessels’ to include government owned ships crewed by private contractors acting
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on behalf of the government.”20 The court then applied this background principle to the
definition under the OPA. It held that:
if a vessel functioning in a public capacity is owned (or bareboat chartered) by
the United States, but crewed by a private contractor, such a vessel constitutes
a ‘public vessel’ so long as the private contractor is acting under the
operational control of the United States and except when the vessel is engaged
in commerce.21
Applying this test, the First Circuit found the Fisher to be a public vessel.22 The First Circuit
demonstrated that the Fisher was under the operational control of the Navy because the
contract between the Navy and AMSEA “clearly established that at all times the Fisher
would be controlled by the U.S military.” 23 Another section of that contract indicated that
the military would exercise “Operational Control.”24 The contract also indicated that
Military Sealift Command Headquarters would exercise “Administrative Control.” 25 The
contract called for the government to exercise final approval of spending if that spending
exceeded $100,000, as well as the incorporation of specific provisions in any subcontract
AMSEA executed.26 Furthermore, the master of the ship “was under an obligation to follow
both a Navy standard operating manual and any additional definitive instructions from the
United States Navy.” 27

Implications
This case provides new guidance for determining the public vessel status of governmentowned vessels that are operated under contract by non-governmental entities. Under the
First Circuit decision, if a vessel is a public vessel under the PVA, then it is likely a public
vessel under the OPA.
This holding may apply to oceanographic research vessels that are part of the U.S.
Academic Research Fleet (“ARF”). ARF vessels are owned by the federal government but
operated by research institutions under charterparty or cooperative agreements.28
Discharges of oil from an ARF vessel may be excluded from OPA liability if the U.S.
government retains operational control over the vessel, as indicated by the relevant
agreement or other evidence, such as direction on the vessel’s schedule and/or oversight
or control over its operations.
This reasoning supporting this holding is not specific to the OPA and could apply in cases
brought under other laws. A wide range of laws and regulations use and define the term
“public vessel.”29 If called on to interpret the meaning of the term under these legal
regimes, courts could apply the Ironshore’s reasoning to find that government-owned
vessels operated under contract are public vessels under the Clean Water Act, admiralty
law, or other laws. This holding therefore may affect a broad range of compliance
3

requirements and potential liabilities for entities contracted to operate government-owned
vessels.

Conclusion
In Ironshore, the First Circuit issued the first holding interpreting the meaning of public
vessel under the OPA. A government-owned vessel crewed by a private contractor is a
public vessel if the government exercises operational control over the vessel. Courts will
determine whether the government retains operational control over such vessels by
considering the contract between the vessel owner and crewing entity, as well as other
relevant indicia of government control.
This study was produced by the Marine Affairs Institute at Roger Williams
University School of Law. Rhode Island Sea Grant Law Fellow Mark Hartmann
provided research and drafting under the guidance of Read Porter, Senior Staff
Attorney.
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